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arch 31, 2007, the most anticipated "Final Four" in
the history of the NCAA basketball tournament is about
to begin. In the opener, the Duke Blue Devils and the
North Carolina Tar Heels will meet for the fourth time
this season. The first three games were decided on last
second shots including a desperation half-court Carolina
buzzer beater three weeks ago in the ACC Tournament
championship game. The Kentucky Wildcats and the Indi-
ana Hoosiers, two border rivals and college basketball pow-
erhouses, will battle in the nightcap. Kentucky triumphed
over Indiana in a triple overtime thriller in December, par
tially due to a pivotal and controversial call by long time
NCAA official John Clougherty Clougherty is scheduled
to referee the contest between theWildcats and Hoosiers.
For the first time in the history of the NCAATournament,
all four number one seeds have made it to the "Final Four."
The featured schools share seventeen national champion-
ships. Longtime college basketball analyst DickVitale died
of a heart attack the night before while excitedly describing
the match-ups for ESPNo
You and your friends have organized all the ele-
ments for an outstanding evening of viewing college basket-
ball. The keg of Budweiser is tapped, the filets are due to be
off the grill any minute, and the Phillips High-DefinitionTele-
vision with surround sound is functioning better than the
salesman at Best Buy described. The CBS pre-game show
sends the telecast down to the floor of the Georgia Dome
to commentators Jim Nantz and Billy Packer, Nantz makes
a chilling announcement. "Ladies and gentleman it appears
that tonight's games will not take place unless the demands
of the Collegiate Athletes Coalition are met by the NCAAY
"Not again!" you scream at your $12,000 television.
Just three short months ago in celebration of a suc-
cessful IPO completion, the corporate practice group of
your law firm had just enjoyed a five star meal at Com
mander's Palace in New Orleans and were on the way
to seats on the Fifty yard line for the NCAA College Foot-
ball Championship between Texas and Florida when you
learned of a similar players' strike. That game was never
played.
Fortunately, CBS replaced the NCAA basketball
coverage with a Survivor Greenland marathon, but your
anger persisted. The absence of labor strife and money
demands is the reason why you loved college sports. As
your guests left the failed party, you muttered to yourself,
"Why would college athletes want to strike?
The events may seem incredible or unlikely.' How-
ever, Ramogi Huma, a former UCLA linebacker, along with
current and former UCLA football players, recently formed
a "student advocacy group". 2 On January 18, 2001, with
the support of the United Steelworkers of America,3 Huma
announced the formation of the Collegiate Athletes Coali-
tion (CAC), which is believed to be the first attempt to
organize student-athletes. ' The Reverend Jesse jackson
recently joined the cause after the deaths during or after
football workouts of Korey Stringer, an all-pro with the
NFUs Minnesota Vikings, Rashidi Wheeler of Northwest-
ern, Eraste Austin of Florida, Devaughn Darling of Florida
State, three high school students and an eighth grader. '
The deaths ofWheelerAustin, and Darling led the CAC to
urge the NCAA to institute immediate reforms to protect
college athletes. 6 They want the NCAA to establish and
enforce safety standards governing voluntary and manda-
tory workouts.' They also want schools to expand health
and life insurance benefits for student-athletes. 8
Generally, Huma and the coalition's proposals are
fairly modest. They refer to the organization as a 'student
advocacy group" rather than a union.' In addition to the
expanded life and health insurance, they seek to eliminate
all employment restrictions during the academic yea, and
increase scholarship stipends to more accurately reflect
the actual cost of attending college. 'o Huma feels these
proposals will help increase graduation rates and improve
the welfare of student-athletes. I Huma says he does not
intend to strike, 2 however, "[w]e'll definitely have tactics
that, if necessary, would be effective enough to bring about
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changes. We're being tight-lipped in case we have to use
them:" 3 This statement seems to indicate that the nation's
fifth largest union might have a role to play. Also, the pres-
ence of Jesse Jackson and Johnnie Cochran on the scene
would seem to make lawsuits more likely than cooperation. 14
This note will focus on the legal feasibility and prac-
ticality of forming a student-athlete players association or
union. It assumes that a strike is a possible avenue the
CAC may take in the future. Unlike the professional sports
unions, the make-up of athletes on college campuses is in
constant flux. This will obviously make it harder to initiate a
strike. Part I of the note will concentrate on the realities of
major college sports and the athletes that play them. This
background will establish why student-athletes may want to
form a players association. Part II will analyze the NCAA
governing structure and how a players association may fit
among this myriad of rules. Part III will analyze labor law
and how it relates to the formation of a student-athlete
players association. Part IV will compare the famed Knight
Commission with the CAC and decide which one is better
suited to lead an intercollegiate athletic reform movement.
Finally, the proper role of a student-athlete association will
be suggested.
Division I college football and basketball make up
a $60 billion industry. "s CBS's television contract for the
NCAA basketball tournament from 2003 to 2013 is for
$6.545 billion. 16 Big Ten and Southeastern Conference
football teams regularly draw greater attendance than NFL
teams, and make millions of dollars from home games. 17
The individual schools, conferences, and the NCAA have
been reaping the benefits of television contracts for col-
lege football since 1984. Prior to 1984, the NCAA con-
trolled all college football telecasts. 18 In 1984, the United
States Supreme Court ruled in favor of the University
of Georgia and the University of Oklahoma by holding
that the NCAA's control of telecasts constituted an illegal
monopoly. 9 Since that ruling, college football programs
have been permitted to negotiate their own TV deals. 20
The College Football Association, consisting of uni-
versities from the major athletic conferences and major
independents such as Notre Dame, was formed to negoti-
ate TV contracts. 2 In 1991, Notre Dame became the first
school to leave the association when they negotiated the
first of three individual national television contracts for col-
lege football games with NBC. 22 The latest renewal was for
$37.5 million. 23 In January of 1994, the Southeastern Con-
ference negotiated a lucrative deal with CBS worth $500
million for broadcast rights over 5 years. 24 The recent for-
mation of the Bowl Championship Series, spearheaded by
Big Ten Commissioner Jim Delany and SEC Commissioner
Roy Kramer, led to a $525 million contract for seven years
with ABC for the broadcasting rights to four postseason
bowl games. 21 In the 2001 college football season, the 50
colleges and universities that participated in bowl games
received a total of $161 million. 26 These contracts and
other arrangements provide a steady source of income for
conferences, schools, and the NCAA. 27
The SEC splits the revenue from college football
bowl games, revenues from the NCAA basketball tourna-
ment, and its television contracts among its member insti-
tutions. According to Commissioner Kramer, the CBS deal
increased the individual payout to universities in the confer-
ence from $1 million to $6 million. 28 For the 1999 college
bowl season, the SEC distributed $1.2 million to each of its
schools in addition to the individual amounts the schools
received from their bowl berths. 29 One member institu-
tion, Vanderbilt University, has not been to a bowl since
the 1982 Hall of Fame Bowl, but it continues to receive a
hefty annual payment. 30 During Kramer's tenure as con-
ference commissioner, the SEC has distributed $540 mil-
lion to member institutions. "' Combining this with the
revenues at the gate for SEC basketball and football games,
the universities derive massive revenue from college sports
and the student-athletes that represent them on the playing
field.
While the student-athletes do not reap any direct
rewards from the millions of dollars they help generate,
their coaches certainly do. Mike Krzyzewski, Duke Univer-
sity's college basketball coach, received a $ I million signing
bonus, a $375,000 salary, and company stock options from
Nike for having Duke's men's basketball players wear Nike
shoes. 32 This does not include any compensation received
from Duke and other endorsements such as his weekly
coaching show and local television ads. 13 His players do
not receive a dime for wearing Nike shoes. These realities
have caused many to charge that college athletes are being
exploited. 34 It provides fuel for the CAC's argument that
student-athletes need better insurance benefits given the
revenues they directly help produce.
The blue-ribbon panel known as the Knight Com-
mission on College Athletics has been the most vocal critic
of the commercialism of college athletics. 31 The twenty-
eight-member panel consists of past and present univer-
sity presidents, corporate executives, and the executive
director of the NCAA, Cedric Dempsey. 36 Ten years ago,
the same commission urged university presidents to regain
control of their athletic programs. 37 The Commission has
voiced its opinion that college sports are a "disgraceful
environment" that has "distorted" the missions of institu-
tions of higher education. 38 Since the Commission's sug-
gested reforms of ten years ago, more than half of the
NCAA Division I athletic programs have been sanctioned
or placed on probation for the violation of NCAA rules, 39 the
graduation rates for Division I basketball players is 42% and
5 I % for football players. 40 Further, the graduation rates
at the power conferences and schools are generally even
worse. 4 The Knight Commission has also publicly decried
the "arms race" which refers to the recent $4 billion con-
struction boom for athletic facilities. 42 Part of their recent
recommendations include cutting coachs' salaries, scaling
back television contracts, and de-emphasizing marketing
and corporate sponsorships. 43 Even James Duderstadt, the
former President of the University of Michigan, which has
arguably the best all-around athletic program in the coun-
try 44 and has an annual athletic budget of $47 million, 4 has
expressed his dissatisfaction with college sports.
Other critics view Division I college sports as an
environment that exploits student-athletes. Some compare
intercollegiate athletics to a plantation system where stu-
dent-athletes are the equivalent of slaves 46 and have simply
traded picking cotton for picking footballs. 47 Stanley Eitzen
charges that student-athletes do not receive a wage in the
form of an athletic scholarship that is commensurate with
the returns they produce. 48 Economist Andrew Zimbalist
has written, "big-time intercollegiate athletics is a unique
industry. No other industry in the United States manages
not to pay its principal producers a wage or a salary" "'
Some would like to point out that they do get a
salary in the form of a free education as well as books and
housing.
However, according to the CAC, athletic scholar-
ships fall about $2,000 short of the full cost of attending
a university. 5" The UCLA athletes who formed the CAC
receive $820 month for room and board but cannot earn
more than $2,000 during the school year. " Many student-
athletes get support from home, but many others do not
because they do not come from privileged socio-economic
backgrounds. These athletes would most likely not have
the opportunity to attend a university without the athletic
scholarship. Furthermore, a study sponsored by the NCAA
in 1988 revealed that 61 % of African American and 40%
of non-African American Division I football and basketball
players had less than $25 per month for personal expenses. 52
Student-athletes often have to take out student loans so
that they can go out on dates or enjoy a meal away from
campus. " A reasonable argument can certainly be made
that these athletes deserve a little extra. Unfortunately,
when that little extra is not available, the market has ways
of providing it, and the sources are not always the most
advantageous for young athletes.
In the NCAA basketball context, college athletes
have the opportunity to forego their college education at
any time. This has lead to an explosion of underclassmen
declaring their eligibility for the National Basketball Associ-
ation's draft. The recent trend has been for high school stu-
dents to bypass the college game altogether for the NBA
Draft. The lucrative contracts that wait are hard to decline.
In the 2001 NBA draft, forty-seven underclassmen and a
record six high school students took part in the draft. "
Kwame Brown, the first pick in the 2001 NBA draft who
had signed with the University of Florida Gators, explained,
"my initial plan was to go to college for a year or two, but
there's not much education in going to college for a year, so
I decided why not go ahead and go to the NBA:' " Other
recent high school graduates, Tyson Chandler and Eddy
Curry, were chosen with the number 2 and 4 picks respec-
tively and became America's newest millionaires without
even a single question from Regis Philbin. 6
Tony Key is a name you will not hear this pro-
fessional or college basketball season. Key, a seven-foot
high school graduate from California, declared for the NBA
draft, but went un-drafted and forfeited his college eligibility
in the process. 17 Like Key, many student-athletes have not
heeded the advice of others who have discouraged them
from entering the NBA draft. These unfortunate athletes
have found themselves un-drafted and
without college eligibility. Almost half
of the players who have declared early
since 1971 have not played in a single
NBA game. 11 In the 2000 NBA
draft, fifty-six players applied for early
entry and only twenty-four were actu-
ally drafted. '9 Scotty Thurman, who
made a key shot in Arkansas's 1994
NCAA championship victory over
Duke, ignored the advice of NBA Direc-
tor of Scouting Marty Blake among others and entered
early. He has been relegated to minor basketball leagues
and does not possess a college degree. 60 He probably
would have been a high draft pick the next year and a
college graduate. Huma's organization intends to address
these concerns by stating, "we want to do what we can to
change policy. But we also want to change the whole cul-
ture in NCAA sports so education becomes the priority.
We want to focus on the 99 percent who do not make it to
the [professional league]."
6 1
Early entry into the NBA draft is one avenue that
some athletes have taken in response to what they see
as hypocrisy in college athletics. Others have sought to
cash in through payouts from agents and boosters. Sports
agents have a reputation as one of the seedier elements
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lurking around college campuses and major athletic pro-
grams. If one were to look up the definition of an undesir-
able62 sports agent in the dictionary, he or she would likely
find a picture of Tank Black. 63
B. Unscrupulous Agents
Tank Black's recent scandal involving the Univer-
sity of Florida and his NFL clients is evidence of why
many do not want sports agents around college campuses.
The potential presence of like-minded individuals strength-
ens the argument to increase student-athlete stipends and
remove the temptation of associating with individuals like
Black. Black's company, Professional Marketing Incorpo-
rated, has represented more than thirty-five NFL players as
clients and signed an unprecedented five first round draft
picks in the 1999 NFL draft. 64 However, Black's biography
will likely not open with this accomplishment.
Black is also the subject of a civil suit filed by the
Securities and Exchange Commission alleging fraud as well
as a federal indictment in Gainesville, Florida for money
laundering, conspiracy, and criminal forfeiture, in what fed-
eral investigators claim is the biggest case of agent fraud
in the history of sports.6 The affair began when he made
under the table payments to University of Florida football
players in the mid-to-late nineties. 66 He had runners give
monthly cash payments of $500 to $600 to Gator football
players Tim Beauchamp, Reggie McGrew, Johnny Rutledge,
Fred Taylor, Reidel Anthony, Ike Hilliard, Jacquez Green
and Dock Pollard in 1998. 67 He purchased a $133,500
Mercedes S600V for Jevon Kearse, the 1999 NFL defensive
rookie of the year, another Florida Gator star. 68 However,
these illegalities were the least of Black's worries.
Black cheated the athletes he represented out of
$15 million as part of a larger $3 14 million offshore Ponzi
scheme in which new investors' money was used to fund
early investors returns. 69 Taylor lost his entire $3.6 mil-
lion signing bonus in this scheme. 70 Furthermore, Black
was recently sentenced to 82 months in prison 71 for his
involvement in a cocaine-trafficking ring and his role in laun-
dering the drug money to offshore accounts. 72 His co-con-
spirator was the subject of a Fox Television's America's Most
Wanted segment and a national manhunt before he com-
mitted suicide while being pursued by St. Louis police offi-
cers. 73 Facts like these make clear that reforms that would
improve the lives of student-athletes in such a manner that
curtails the influence of individuals like Black are worth pur-
suing. 74
C. Boosters and Alumni Problems
If Tank Black is the textbook example for an agent
run amuck, then the recent scandals in Memphis involving
the University of Alabama and the University of Kentucky
football programs provide textbook example of booster
and alumni problems. 7' The involvement of the coaching
staffs of each university in each scandal also sends a mes-
sage that the athletes sought are commodities and not
human beings seeking an education. In the fall of 1999,
Albert Means of Trezvant High School in Memphis was a
blue-chip high school lineman sought by all of the major
college football programs in the country. 76 Lynn Lang and
Milton Kirk, his high school football coaches, allegedly sold
Means to the highest bidder. 77 Realizing that Means was
one of the nation's top prospects, Lang demanded cash,
cars, and a house from college recruiters atAlabama,Arkan-
sas, Florida State, Georgia, Kentucky, and Michigan State. 78
The bidding allegedly started at $60,000, two cars, and a
house for Means' mother. 7 Jim Donnan, who was the head
football coach at Georgia at the time was not allowed to
visit with Means because he would not promise cash and
cars. 80 The bidding allegedly ended when Logan Young, a
Memphis businessman and Alabama booster, agreed to pay
Lang $115,000. 81 Lang bought a $48,500 Ford Explorer,
acquired alleged total compensation of $200,000 and did
not share the loot with Means' mother or his co-conspira-
tor Kirk. 82 As a result, Kirk squealed resulting in his own
indictment for conspiracy and a nine-count indictment of
conspiracy, bribery, and extortion against Lang. 83 The FBI is
currently investigating the involvement of LoganYoung. 8' Mean-
while, Alabama received five years of NCAA probation
including a two-year postseason bowl ban, and the loss of
21 scholarships. Means transferred to the University of
Memphis and Means' mother and five children were almost
evicted. 85
Kentucky's abuses seem minor compared to the
Means debacle. Claude Bassett, Kentucky's former recruit-
ing coordinator, sent former Memphis Melrose High School
coach Tim Thompson $1,400 in money orders in an attempt
to induce Thompson to have his players sign with the
Wildcats.86 Head Coach Hal Mumme resigned after self-
reporting over three-dozen violations to the NCAA. 8 7 The
majority of these violations involved the recruitment scan-
dals at Melrose and Trezvant High in Memphis. One day
before the NCAA announced Alabama's sanctions, Ken-
tucky was placed on three years of probation and lost nine-
teen scholarships. Forty young men will not receive an ath-
letic scholarship and have the opportunity to receive a col-
lege education because of these misdeeds.
D. Academic Scandals
Unfortunately, some scholarship athletes do not
receive an education worthy of the academic institution
they attend. A college athletic scholarship is given to recipi-
ents so that they can receive a quality education free of
cost. However, the actual receipt of a quality education is
often not achieved. Some feel that the overemphasis of
college athletics is to blame. A recent academic scandal at
the University of Minnesota illustrates this point. In March
of 1999, Jan Ganglehoff, a former academic counselor in
Minnesota's athletic department, admitted to writing over
400 papers, assignments, and take-home examinations for
20 Minnesota basketball players with the knowledge and
support of head basketball coach Clem Haskins. 8 In March
of 1997, shortly after Minnesota's appearance in the "Final
Four," Courtney James turned in one of Ganglehoff's papers
to Assistant Professor Sander Latts who considered it the
best paper he had read in his forty years at the University
of Minnesota.8 9 Ganglehoff suggested that at least sixty-five
Minnesota professors should have noticed that the players
were plagiarizing papers and committing academic fraud
and did nothing. 9' These "friendly fac-
ulty" are not unique to the University
of Minnesota. 9' Bobby Jackson, a star
guard for Minnesota's 1997 Final Four
team and the current starting guard for
the NBA's Sacramento Kings, received
four hours of independent study credit
for typing "basketball" into a database
and listing the articles that resulted
from the search. 9' During Haskins
tenure at Minnesota from 1986 until his
forced resignation in 1998, only twenty-
three percent of his players graduated.
93 Haskins has been banned from
coaching in the NCAA until 2007 9' for
his actions, which were in clear violation
of NCAA rules concerning student-athlete welfare. 91
These recent scandals are extreme examples of
problems with college athletics. They illustrate that there
are some major problems with intercollegiate athletics, and
it is unfortunate that student-athletes are caught in the
middle. They also illustrate that reform is needed. The
CAC is seeking to improve the welfare of student-ath-
letes. The reforms they propose will hopefully increase
graduation rates, provide better insurance for athletes, and,
by increasing the room and board stipend and allowable
employment earnings, remove some of the temptations and
sleaziness that accompany successful college athletes. The
first major obstacle the CAC will face in achieving these
goals is an enormous bureaucracy located in Indianapolis,
Indiana known as the NCAA, and its amateurism rules.
The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a
voluntary unincorporated association consisting of over
I, 100 private and public universities in the United States."
The NCAA is divided into three separate divisions based
on size, scope, and competitive level of athletic programs. 97
Division I is the domain of big-time college athletics and is
the focus of this note.
Among the NCAA's many roles are to adopt play-
ing rules, to establish academic eligibility standards, to regu-
late the recruitment of college athletes, to conduct cham-
pionships, and to promulgate rules about the size of athletic
squads and coaching staffs. 98 One of the NCAA's stated
purposes is to "initiate, stimulate and improve intercolle-
giate athletics programs for student-athletes and to pro-
mote and develop educational leadership, physical fitness,
athletics excellence and athletics participation as a recre-
ational pursuit." " The CAC shares the goal of stimulating
and improving programs for student-athletes.
The NCAA's basic purpose is stated in its funda-
mental policy section of article I of the NCAA Constitu-
tion. The NCAA's basic purpose is to "maintain intercol-
legiate athletics as an integral part of the educational pro-
gram and the athlete as an integral part of the student body
and, by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between
intercollegiate athletics and professional sports." 100 Refer-
ences to amateurism can be found throughout the NCAA
manual. However, bylaw 12 is the most comprehensive.
This provision of the NCAA manual defines "a clear line of
demarcation between college and professional sports."
The general principles under bylaw 12 establish the
NCAA'S view of amateurism. Only amateur student-ath-
letes are eligible to participate in intercollegiate sports. 0I
The NCAA does not consider a grant-in aid given by a
member institution to be pay or a promise to pay for ath-
letic skill. Therefore, NCAA student-athletes can maintain
their amateur status while on scholarship. 102 The NCAA
defines an amateur as one who participates in sports solely
for the love of the game. Fifteen pages of its manual are
devoted to more clearly defining what constitutes an ama-
teur student-athlete. Another forty plus pages are devoted
to financial aid, awards, and benefits that will affect the ama-
teur status of student-athletes.
In order to maintain amateur status, the student-
athlete must comply with these cumbersome and vague
guidelines. An amateur student-athlete cannot receive pay-
ment for his or her athletic skill because this transforms
the student-athlete from an amateur into a professional.
'03 Student-athletes cannot accept a promise of future pay
after their college eligibility has passed and cannot sign a
commitment to play professional sports while an amateur. 104
However, the NCAA does allow for student-athletes to be
a professional in one sport while an amateur in another. 'o'
Regardless, the NCAA rules contain an exhaustive list of
items that constitute pay and would cause a student-athlete
to forfeit his or her collegiate eligibility and amateur status
because these items are deemed to make the individual a
professional rather than an amateur. 106 The NCAA also
imposes stringent guidelines for "participating" with profes-
sional teams. 107 The policy seems to be that an amateur's
mere appearance with professional athletes will taint them
with the professional label and tarnish college athletics and
its promotion of amateurism. Since NCAA rules allow ath-
letes to be a professional in one sport while maintaining
amateur status in another, these rules seem contradictory
and hypocritical. The few exceptions that exist are mainly
in place for athletes that participate on either United States
or foreign Olympic teams. '08
The amateurism bylaw also governs student-athlete
employment. 09 Compensation must be for work actually
performed and at a reasonable local rate for the services
provided. '10 They cannot be compensated because of their
athletic ability. III Student-athletes cannot receive money
by teaching or coaching their particular sport. 112 Student-
athletes cannot be employed to sell equipment related to
their sport if they are used to promote the product. "3 If
they are not used to promote the product, then they can
be employed at an hourly rate or set salary equal to that
of a non-athlete. 114 In any employment, a student-athlete
can only earn $2,000 during the year. 115 The NCAA also
regulates the use of student-athletes in promotional activi-
ties. 116 Interestingly, a student-athlete cannot appear in
commercial or advertisement for athletic equipment, 117 but
they are allowed to wear the equipment and logos of these
companies on their uniforms and apparel. 11 The NCAA
and its member institutions make considerable amounts of
money by placing these logos on their athletic team's uni-
forms. I11
Bylaw IS specifically deals with financial aid and
establishes that the receipt of improper financial aid results
in the forfeiture of eligibility and loss of amateur status. 120
Financial aid must conform with the amateurism bylaw
unless it comes from a guardian, is not awarded on the
basis of athletic ability, or is awarded through a continuing
aid program to students such as the national merit scholar
program. 12' Also, institutions are not allowed to give aid
to a student-athlete that exceeds the cost of attendance
normally incurred by students at that particular university. '12
Cost of attendance includes tuition and fees, room and
board, books and supplies, and other related expenses. 123
Division I student-athletes at major programs receive a full
grant-in-aid which includes the full cost of tuition and fees,
room and board, and required books. '24 A student-athlete
is not eligible to participate in intercollegiate athletics if his
financial aid exceeds the full grant-in-aid. 2I The full grant-
in-aid is for only one year 126 and renewal is not automatic. '27
Furthermore, it is not permissible for an institution to assure
the student-athlete that the grant-in-aid will automatically
continue after the one-year period if the student-athlete
sustains an illness or injury that prevents his or her com-
petition in intercollegiate athletics, but it can inform them
of a general renewal policy. 28 These rules appear to make
the relationship between student-athletes and universities
employment at-will.
The sheer volume of rules violations by intercolle-
giate athletic programs raises questions about the legitimacy
of the amateurism rules. 129 In general, the NCAA's goals
of maintaining amateurism conflict with the sizable reve-
nues they generate in the sports and
entertainment landscape. In reality,
many Division I football and basket-
ball players probably no longer play
for simply the love of the game. The
regulations governing The Olympic
Games (upon which the NCAA ama-
teurism rules seem to be based) have
abandoned this ideal. 30 In fact, the
modern Olympic Games were built on a misconception
that the ancient Greek Olympics consisted of amateur ath-
letes. 3I A similar misconception seems to exist in col-
legiate athletics because compensation was awarded in
the first ever-documented intercollegiate competition. 32
Today, the NCAA is the largest sports organization that
prohibits its participants from receiving compensation. The
student-athlete participants are the ones who have the
most to lose from this vague and enormous set of rules.
By violating the rules to the slightest extent, the student-
athlete will forfeit his or her eligibility and that will almost
always result in loss of his or her scholarship. This is
a curious result for an organization with the goal to pro-
tect and enhance the physical and educational welfare of
the student-athletes. This raises two questions: To what
extent are these rules the final say for student-athletes?
Can a potential student-athletes' organization designed to
address the unfairness of the rules successfully challenge
them?
Ao id~da De e c to tBe M
asStat ActeF
Accomplishing this task will be very diffi-
cult because the NCAA is given much deference by the
court system regarding the rules that it promulgates. In
NCAA v.Tarkanian, the Supreme Court held in general that a
system of rules and regulations accompanied by reasonable
enforcement mechanisms was essential to the conduct of
intercollegiate athletics and of fostering competition among
amateur athletic teams. "'
This landmark case involved Jerry Tarkanian, the
legendary basketball coach of the University of Nevada Las
Vegas Running Rebels. The NCAA began investigating Tar-
kanian shortly after he took the UNLV job after a stint at
Long Beach State. The battle between Tarkanian and the
NCAA ended fifteen years later before the Supreme Court.
Tarkanian argued that the NCAA violated his due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment through their
infractions committee investigation that ordered UNLV to
suspend him from coaching. "I In order for the NCAA
to meet the "state action" requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the action that violates the due process rights
must either be that of an instrument of the state, such as a
state funded college or university, or must be accomplished
under the color of state law. "'
The Supreme Court held that the NCAA's suspen-
sion of Tarkanian did not constitute state action and was
not performed under color of state law. 36 The NCAA is
merely an agent of its member institutions, which as com-
petitors with UNLV, had an interest in the fair enforcement
of its regulatory provisions. 137 Furthermore, the NCAA's
investigation, enforcement proceedings, and recommenda-
tion to UNLV that they suspend their coach did not con-
stitute state action because UNLV had not delegated the
authority to the NCAA to take specific action against a
UNLV employee. 38 Thus, the NCAA could not directly
discipline Tarkanian. They could only threaten additional
sanctions against UNLV if they did not suspend their coach.
Additionally, the source of NCAA rules that were the basis
for action taken against Tarkanian came from the collective
membership of the NCAA, a multistate organization, and
not from the state of Nevada. '39 The adoption of the rules
by UNLV did not make them state rules because UNLV
could withdraw from the NCAA and adopt its own stan-
dards at any time. 140 The Supreme Court also held that
the function of fostering amateur athletics at the collegiate
level was an important public function, but it was neither
a traditional nor an exclusive state function. 141 Thus, the
NCAA's rules and the enforcement mechanisms behind
them were deemed to be a reasonable way to regulate
intercollegiate athletics.
Several legal commentators have argued that the
NCAA's amateurism rules violate the Sherman Act and
Antitrust law. 42 The traditional argument is that the ama-
teurism rules violate § I of the Sherman Act because the
NCAA and colleges and universities have banded together
to fix the amount of compensation that college athletes
receive (the grant-in-aid), and they boycott those athletes
who try to ascertain their market value by consulting with
agents, entering professional drafts, and earning more than
$2,000 from employment. 143 Plus, the NCAA compensa-
tion limit denies student-athletes a fair share of the rev-
enues they generate for their schools. 144 This challenge has
fallen short in past cases. Courts have been reluctant to
apply the Sherman Act to NCAA eligibility rules because
they have found that the amateurism rules are not com-
mercially motivated. 141 In other cases, courts have assumed
that the rules were subject to antitrust law, but have not
invalidated them. 146
In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Okla-
homa, the Supreme Court held that the NCAA was subject
to antitrust scrutiny under a rule of reason analysis. How-
ever, this only applied to the ability of member institutions
to sell the rights to televise their college football games. 4I
The rule of reason analysis requires the court to evaluate
the rule's impact on competition. 148 The Court held that
NCAA rules should be upheld if they increase economic
marketplace competition by preserving college sports. 149
In dicta, the Court indicated that the limited compensation
rules of the NCAA enhanced com-
petition because the rules advanced
the noble tradition of amateurism and
that this ideal was necessary to pre-
serve intercollegiate athletics.' 0 Lower
courts often rely on this reasoning to
uphold the amateurism rules of the
NCAA. "I The amateurism rules have
avoided antitrust scrutiny because they
are purely or primarily non-commercial in nature. The right
to televise college football games is commercial in nature
and is the reason the NCAA found itself subject to the
antitrust laws in Board of Regents. Generally, the law has
historically not been on the side of an active challenge by a
student organization.
The current state of intercollegiate athletics lends
itself more towards a finding of a Sherman Act violation.
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The reality of intercollegiate athletics does not square with
the amateurism ideal of playing only for the love of the
game. The huge revenues generated and the time spent on
the practice field and in the weight room supply the evi-
dence. In order to triumph under the Sherman Act, the
court must be persuaded that the stated purpose of the
NCAA does not conform to the reality of college athletics,
and the eligibility rules are commercially motivated.
C. NCAA Division I Manual Seen as
Default Rules
The CAC's pleas may not fall on deaf ears. The
NCAA Constitution is similar to a corporate charter or a
standard form contract agreed to by the institutions and
the NCAA. Therefore, these are simply default rules; as in
the case of a constitution or a corporate charter, they may
be amended. The NBA draft and inquiry exemption, 152
the exemption for ordinary and necessary expenses related
to the Olympic games, "53 the exemption for training
expenses for Olympic events, 154 and the exemption for an
individual borrowing against his or her future earnings ..5
are examples of recent amendments.
The NCAA probably would counter that an orga-
nization already exists to address student-athlete concerns.
The Student-Athlete Advisory Committee reports to the
NCAA management council and consists of one student-
athlete representative from each Division I conference. 1 6
This student-athlete organization is a passive representa-
tive of student-athletes and not a strong voice for potential
reform. 117 Only two of its members attend each meeting
of the management council, 158 of which they are non-voting
members. 159 Their duties consist of receiving information,
reviewing it, and commenting. 160 Recently, the Student-
Athlete Advisory Committee made six proposals to the
NCAA management council-all six were rejected. "6' If
the NCAA truly has student-athlete welfare in mind, then
they will let student-athletes voice real concerns and pos-
sibly adopt some of their provisions. They should at the
very least be willing to engage in an open dialogue. Uni-
versities are supposed to be the marketplace of ideas, and
the NCAA should be a place where student-athletes can
share their ideas for improving the intercollegiate athletics
system.
A. The National Labor Relations Act
The Wagner Act of 1935, better known as the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), regulates labor rela-
tions that effect interstate and foreign commerce. It was
designed to encourage collective bargaining and to protect
workers for the purpose of negotiating their terms of
employment. 162 Employees have a legally enforceable right
giving them the freedom to associate, self-organize, and
designate representatives for this purpose. 163 Later, it was
established that the NLRA was also designed to protect
employees' rights to collective action in securing satisfac-
tory wages, hours, and employment conditions. 164 The
Labor Management Relations Act was added in 1947 to
improve upon the previous enactments. It sought to
redress the imbalance of economic power between labor
and management and to protect employees' exercise of
their organizational rights. Complaints under the NLRA
are brought to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
and any reasonably defensible decisions by the NLRB are
given a great deal of deference by the court system. 165
B. Student-Athlete Employees
For the purposes of the CAC, the definition of
employee is of utmost importance. Employee under the
NLRA means any employee unless otherwise excluded by
the Act. 166 The term "employee" as used in the NLRA
is not to be stretched beyond individuals who work for
another for hire. 167
Students are not generally held to be employees
and are not protected under the NLRA. For example, a
student paid an apprentice wage full-time during summer
and part-time during the school year is not an employee.
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Despite contrary historical precedent, the NLRB has
recently held that hospital interns, residents, and graduate
students are "employees" according to the NLRA. 169
Given these results, an argument that student-athletes are
employees of the university might be successful. The theo-
retical argument could be advanced that student-athletes
are employees because of mandatory practices during the
season and the amount of revenue they generate. How-
ever, there is still a fundamental difference between a stu-
dent-athlete receiving a grant-in-aid, and a student who
assists in teaching duties or medical staff functions and is
compensated directly for those services. Given courts'
deference to the NCAA, and the following decisions in
the workers' compensation context, this argument would
probably fail.
C. The Worker's Compensation Claim
for Student Athlete as Employee
The only significant push to recognize student-ath-
letes as employees is in the workers' compensation con-
text. 170 The first major case to address the issue found
in favor of the student-athlete. 171 In University of Denver
v. Nemeth, a University of Denver football player who suf-
fered a back injury was found to be an employee because
the benefits he received were conditioned upon him play-
ing football. 172 He performed maintenance work at the
university as well as playing football. 173 However, Nemeth
was overturned four years later by the Colorado Supreme
Court, which held that an employee-employer relationship
did not exist between scholarship athletes and a university. 174
Also, a scholarship athlete at a California univer-
sity was also found to be an employee. 175 He was an ath-
letic scholarship recipient who died in a plane crash. 176
However, in 1965 and 1981 California amended their work-
ers' compensation statutes to exclude student-athletes. 177
While these decisions have been overturned, they do pro-
vide a minimal basis for arguing that a student-athlete is an
employee and would be helpful in the context of expanded
health insurance that the CAC seeks.
The more recent cases have been discouraging to
the cause of finding an employment relationship between
a university and a student-athlete on scholarship. In Rens-
ing v. Indiana State University Board of Trustees, such a claim
was made and the state of Indiana employed the NCAA's
limited compensation and amateurism rules as a defense. "18
Rensing was paralyzed during a football practice, 179 and he
was denied coverage because the Industrial Board did not
consider him an employee. 80 The Supreme Court of Indi-
ana found a lack of intent to enter into an employment rela-
tionship and found in favor of the school. 8 The NCAA
language referred to the receipt of tuition, room and board,
lab fees, and a book allowance as a grant-in-aid and not pay-
ment for athletic participation. 182 The use of NCAA rules
in this case strikes a strong blow against viewing student-
athletes as employees.
However, this blow may have been softened by the
United States Supreme Court, which held that food, shelter,
and clothing in lieu of wages constitutes both payment and
an employer-employee relationship under the Fair Labor
Standards Act. 83 Generally, the Supreme Court has been
friendly to the NCAA in its decisions, therefore while this
precedent could be used, it is likely that the Court would
continue to side with the NCAAo The university could
argue that the food, shelter, and clothing is not given in lieu
of wages but is given as part of a scholarship that many
students including non-student-athletes receive. In Cole-
man v Western Michigan University, a state court followed
this reasoning by finding that a scholarship athlete is not an
employee but "first and foremost a student." 184
In the most recent workers' compensation deci-
sion, a Texas Court unanimously held that a Texas Chris-
tian University scholarship athlete was not an employee
because no contract for hire existed. 8 Therefore, the law
seems as resistant to the finding of a student-athlete as
employee as it is to the finding that the amateurism rules
violate the Sherman Act. However, the CAC has a voice
that needs to be heard, and it is probably the best way
for student-athletes to address their concerns and in turn





The most outspoken critic of the current affairs of
college athletics has been the blue-ribbon panel of past and
present university presidents known as the Knight Com-
mission, which issued its first report ten years ago. The
most recent report echoes many of the same complaints as
the previous one. It seems the Knight Commission is adept
at identifying problems but not as skilled at actually coming
up with solutions. 186 Some of their latest proposals seem
fairly unrealistic given today's climate. "87 The Commission's
most recent suggestions include: denying post-season par-
ticipation to any institution that does not have a graduation
rate of at least 50% for its student athletes; eliminating aca-
demic exceptions for athletes; encouraging the NBA and
NFL to develop minor leagues so athletes who do not wish
to attend college do not have to; and reducing coaches sala-
ries to a level more commensurate with the other mem-
bers of the institution.
Behind many of the proposals seems to be an elit-
ism that seeks not to open the doors of education to
student-athletes in Division I basketball and football pro-
grams but to close the doors to these miscreants who have
brought commercialism to the college
campus. The Commission neglects to
mention the corporate dollars taken
by other departments of the univer-
sity. Professors receive grants funded
by corporations and local businesses-
businesses headed by wealthy alumni
who donate buildings and great sums
of money for research. 88 The ratio-
nale for the Knight Commission's pro-
posals appears to be a return an era
when athletic programs did not domi-
nate college campuses and educational
pursuits were taken more seriously, when in fact this 'yes-
teryear' that they want to re-establish may be a utopia that
never truly existed.
When asked in the 1960's if the football program
at Alabama was being overemphasized at the expense of
educational programs and other aspects of the University,
legendary college football coach Paul "Bear" Bryant replied,
"Well fellas, maybe, but its awful damn hard to rally around
a math class." College football programs in the SEC and
in the Big Ten have consistently enjoyed a reverence that
the liberal arts program or the undergraduate accounting
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school could not achieve in their wildest dreams. This is
not meant to suggest that big-time college athletics is the
same as it has always been. The money and the problems
that go with it are probably bigger today proportionally, and
it is possible that if Bryant and his houndstooth hat were
around today that he would sharply criticize what has hap-
pened to college athletics. The fact that Bryant might join
the chorus of past and present university presidents and
criticize the commercialization of intercollegiate athletics
does not mean that they are the sole leaders in the search
for a solution of remedying college athletics.
An organization of student-athletes that has the
interests of student-athletes in mind is certainly better
than a proposal that suggests having fewer student-athletes
obtain an education. The Knight Commission would rather
the NBA and NFL fund a minor league to deal with the
dumb jocks. Books are to be read and cherished by all not
locked up by those who feel that athletes are not worthy of
an education because of the tarnished reputation a success-
ful athletic program brings to their hallowed halls. Huma
says that his organization is committed to the 99 out of 100
that do not wind up making it professionally and improving
welfare for all student-athletes. His organization deserves a
chance because as time has proven the Knight Commission
is good at proposals but poor with results. 189
University presidents have been criticized for the
current state of higher education, and many of these com-
plaints are much louder than complaints about the status of
intercollegiate athletics. 90 Therefore, perhaps those indi-
viduals are not the best leaders of intercollegiate reform.
The student-athlete is the individual who has the most
to gain from a reform of intercollegiate athletics, which
suggests that those student-athletes who seek to change
the system are the correct leaders of reform. The CAC
deserves for its voice to be heard by the NCAA and uni-
versity heads. Through an open dialogue between these
two parties, some changes may be possible that improve
the welfare of the student-athlete. This would be a better
alternative than empty rhetoric and proposals of returning
things to the way they once were.
A. Practical Obstacles
There are some potential potholes on the road to
reform that any student-athlete organization will face. They
have a collective action problem. The only student-athletes
with an incentive to join are male athletes from major col-
lege football programs and the mid-tier to major college
basketball programs. This does not provide a great deal of
grass roots support. Furthermore, NCAA student-athletes
are a very diverse group. 191 Therefore, finding a collective
interest could be quite difficult.
Also, it will be extremely costly for universities
to even slightly increase the room and board stipend and
insurance benefits of its student-athletes because it would
have to be done for every Division I male and female ath-
lete due to Title IX. 192 So, there could also be a free rider
problem. Furthermore, one of the main problems with big-
time intercollegiate athletics is that it has become a compe-
tition between the haves and have-nots. Two-thirds of Divi-
sion I programs claim to be losing money. The additional
costs incurred by stipends and extended insurance benefits
could be disastrous to these programs and would probably
cause more programs to run a budget deficit. A stipend of
only $150 would require approximately $29 million from
intercollegiate institutions. 194 The potential added costs do
not stop atTitle IX. There are potential labor law' 95 , work-
ers compensation, 96 taxation, 97 antitrust, 98 and vicarious
liability'99 issues as well. Therefore, any reform proposals by
the CAC, in addition to facing legal hurdles, are going to be
potentially costly and controversial.
B. Political Interest Group Model
This does not necessarily limit the potential effec-
tiveness of the CAC for contributing ideas and pushing the
NCAA to consider different proposals and change their
rules for the betterment of all student-athletes. It is pos-
sible for the CAC to be effective with this admirable but
limited goal. Huma and the organization's leaders need to
be cognizant of their goals to improve student-athlete wel-
fare and the conditions that drove them to form their
organization. When major politicians such as Jesse Jackson
and interest groups like the United Steelworkers of Amer-
ica start dominating the picture, the original agenda may
be temporarily or permanently pushed aside. The original
goals could be forgotten, and the fight could be for some-
one else's vision and not truly the student-athlete's. This
may not be inevitable, but it is an often-repeated scenario.
When strikes or other similar heavy-handed tactics
enter the picture, then it is possible that the cause could
be lost. The great thing about "March Madness" is that it
involves the dreams of the young. On a Friday night in Salt
Lake City, an eighteen-year-old kid could hit a game win-
ning shot to defeat the defending national champions. On
Tuesday morning, however, he could be just another ner-
vous freshman taking a seat in a much smaller auditorium
hoping that he remembers all the formulas for a calculus
exam. Strikes would rob college athletics of this picture
and in doing so they would hurt college athletics as well as
the colleges and universities that support them.
The more appropriate model of organization for
student-athletes is a political interest group rather than
a labor union. Student-athlete organizations could lobby
members of the NCAA Board of Directors as well as
the Student-Athlete Advisory Committee about potential
NCAA legislation. They could make proposals of their own
through this process. Football, basketball, baseball, track
and field, female or male, Division II or Ill, and even different
ethnic groups could each have their own "interest group"
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if they so desired. The Student Basketball Council orga-
nized by the National Association of Basketball Coaches
is a model of this type of organization. 20 In order to
improve intercollegiate athletics, the athletic concept of
teamwork must prevail. This requires many voices not just
one because there is no "I" in team. Earlier this year, the
NCAA was scheduled to meet with the CAC. They can-
celled that meeting through their Student-Athlete Advisory
Committee after learning of the involvement of the United
Steelworkers. 20, The NCAA should not have cancelled
that meeting because an open dialogue could have begun.
An example of teamwork that will help achieve reform in
collegiate athletics is the recent undertaking of shared ini-
tiatives between the CAC and the Drake Group, an out-
spoken critic of the commercialization of college sports
and the NCAA, consisting of faculty members of universi-
ties. 202
Intercollegiate athletics is a complex system. Like
any complex system, it will have problems that need to be
fixed from time to time. Despite the many legal hurdles and
practical obstacles that stand in the way of the CAC, it can
achieve many of its lofty goals. The sports world teaches
us many lessons, among these is that success in sports and
life do not come overnight. Rather, they are the product
of hard work and courage. The education one receives
in college and the lessons learned on the playing field
can increase the probability of success in every human
endeavor. University presidents, leading scholars, athletic
directors and coaches, and hard working student-athletes
generally have learned these lessons well and working
together they should be able to find a solution to the puzzle
that is modern intercollegiate athletics.
A truly valiant effort will be rewarded; the puzzle
will be solved; and the goal achieved-sports and life teach
this lesson. After centuries of trying, man finally broke
the four-minute mile in 1954. It took until the middle
of this century before an African-American finally played
the American pastime in the major leagues. After three
decades of attempting to suppress freedom,The Berlin Wall
fell. After a decade of millions of dollars spent, lives lost,
muscle and intellectual manpower exhausted, man walked
on the moon. Five years after hearing, "you have cancer,"
a Texan won the Tour de France for the third consecutive
time. The obstacles facing the reform of intercollegiate ath-
letics do not require superhuman effort but merely team-
work. Unfair rules and supposed unreachable records are
meant to give way. Hopefully, the CAC is an organization
worthy of the lofty heights it seeks to reach. Together, the
NCAA and an organization looking out for the rights of
student-athletes should be able to enhance the welfare of
student-athletes and improve intercollegiate athletics.
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